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Introduction
In late 1944, Enrique P. Osés, his aim in life of a fascist Argentina irretrievably
wrecked, disappeared from the public scene. With the retreat “into complete
obscurity” (Rock 1995: 277, n. 44)1 the nacionalista movement lost one of its
most radical, outspoken, intransigent, and controversial representatives. It also
lost one of its most important and influential figures, notwithstanding the fact
that Osés soon fell into oblivion. Since the early 1930s he had, as editor of the
nacionalista dailies Crisol (1932-1939), El Pampero (1939-1944), and El Fed-
eral (1944) (the successor paper of El Pampero), influenced the orientation of
significant sectors of the more extreme sectors of Nacionalismo, as well as the
movement’s perception by the Argentine public in general. Moreover, by the
end of the decennium Osés, a “talented agitator and orator” who tirelessly
preached his convictions (Buchrucker 1982: 191), had even partly pushed
through his claims to leadership within the nacionalista movement; in Santa
Fe and Mendoza the Unión Nacionalista, the dominant organisation in these
two provinces, accepted him as its leader.
One reason for the rapid fall into obscurity was that Osés, unlike other
prominent nacionalista militants, never published a book, or memoirs after his
retirement. He never laid down his convictions in a (more or less) coherent
way.2 Another important factor, and arguably the more decisive one, was his
* I would like to thank Flavia Fiorucci and Federico Finchelstein for their thoughtful and
stimulating comments on earlier drafts of the paper as well as Martín Recchia and espe-
cially Marsha Schlesinger for undertaking invaluable additional research in Buenos
Aires.
1 According to Rock, he died in late 1954. Santillán (1960: 96) states on the other hand
that Osés left journalism in 1945 and subsequently dedicated himself to commerce and
industry, dying in December 1956.
2 This also means that, in order to comprehend and analyse his ideas, one has to rely on
his countless editorials and numerous speeches, published in Criterio, Crisol and El
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well-known collaboration with the Third Reich. Immediately after the out-
break of the Second World War Nazi Germany had won the virulent anti-Semi-
te and ardent devotee of the Fuhrer over to the publication of El Pampero,
which was, until 1942, when Manuel Fresco, the former Conservative gover-
nor of the province of Buenos Aires, began to publish Cabildo, “the only
nationalist newspaper in Buenos Aires that pretended to compete with the pop-
ular dailies” (Rennie 1945: 273). In view of the Third Reich’s defeat, and the
detailed revelation of the enormous atrocities it had been responsible for, the
next generation of Nacionalistas was not interested in cultivating the image of
a man who had maintained close relations with Nazism. After 1945 a known
collaborator could not serve as a role model.
Osés was a rather unpleasant person, never missing a chance to show his
hatred for his opponents,3 even fellow Nacionalistas. And he was “of very
limited intellectual relevance” (Nascimbene / Neuman 1993: 140, n. 43).4 Yet,
whatever justified reservations one might have, his influence within the
nacionalista movement should not be underestimated.5 This chapter will
reconstruct Osés relatively short public career. It will discuss his activities
between the late 1920s and the mid-1940s and provide an assessment of his
programmatic positions, showing its continuities as well discontinuities over
time. In more general terms, Osés will serve as a (radical) example of the
developments and changes the nacionalista movement experienced during the
period under consideration. I will argue that Osés, as the 1930s progressed,
became more extreme. At the end of the decennium he can be characterised as
a fascist.6
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Pampero over the years. They were “sloganeering” and “frequently incoherent” (Rock
1995: 107), as even some supporters occasionally noted. For the reaction of a follower,
cf. Osés (1941b: 80). Published in November 1941, the booklet reproduced a series of
articles Osés had written during his detention in Villa Devoto in May of the same year.
3 El Pampero described, for example, the US-American author and journalist Waldo
David Frank as “the Yankee-Jew Frank”. Frank, in turn, showed little restraint either,
referring to Osés as “the rat who directs the nazi sheet” (Frank 1944: 57 and 128).
4 Spektorowski (2003: 174) on the other hand describes Osés as one of the
“major…nationalist intellectuals”. I agree with Nascimbene and Neuman on this point.
Osés’s thinking does not merit the characterisation “intellectual”.
5 As far as I am aware, no single article or book chapter has been published about Osés.
6 This point is related to the ongoing debate about the nature of the Nacionalistas. For an
insightful summary of the existing secondary literature, see Finchelstein (2002: 10-27).
The nacionalista movement underwent a process of radicalisation during the Infamous
Decade, undoubtedly the period when it was at its strongest. This process was neither lin-
ear nor did it effect all Nacionalistas to the same extent. But whereas in the early 1930s
no single nacionalista group (or militant) can be described as fascist, the situation later in
the decade was very different. And Osés’s development is illustrative of this process.
SEBASTIANI  10/4/06  09:59  Página 14
The “Divine Truths” of the Catholic Church
In the late 1920s, the future intellectual and political development of Osés, in
his early thirties at the time,7 was by no means foreseeable. Osés started his
career in Convivio, a group dedicated to the promotion of young writers and
artists that had emerged from the Comisión de Artes y Letras de los Cursos de
Cultura Católica.8 In March 1928 he joined Criterio, a new magazine directed
by Atilio Dell’Oro Maini (a leading figure of Convivio) and launched to ensure
the wider dissemination of the Catholic Church’s ideas. As Criterio’s “theatre
critic”, Osés was one of its sixty permanent national collaborators. Reflecting
his subordinate position within the group of “respectable Catholics” and “good
believers” (Ruschi Crespo 1998: 92 and 148) editing the publication, which
primarily aimed its authoritarian message at the “traditional proprietary sec-
tors” of Argentine society (Rapalo 1990: 53), during the first two years of its
existence Osés kept to the sidelines. In his articles he focused on dramatic crit-
icism, and in his lectures he talked about the situation of the Argentine theatre.
Behind the scenes Osés must have been very active, however, scheming
for his rise through the ranks of Criterio. In early 1930 his machinations final-
ly bore fruit. Following a dispute between Dell’Oro Maini and the Argentine
hierarchy about the programmatic orientation of the magazine –a dispute that
had its origins in Pope Pius XI’s efforts to unite “the faithful under the inspira-
tion of the Catholic Action”– the young theatre critic assumed its provisional
editorship (Lafleur / Provenzano / Alonso 1968: 127). This change of person-
nel signalled a programmatic reorientation of the publication. While retaining
its anti-democratic discourse and attacks on the administration of President
Hipólito Yrigoyen (1928-1930), under the direction of Osés, who represented
a group of militant Catholics identifying with the interests of the Acción
Católica Argentina, Criterio’s tone became “more confessional”. In accor-
dance with the Church’s explicit wishes, it devoted less space to political prob-
lems and paid more attention to Catholic doctrine (Zanatta 1996: 48-49; Rapa-
lo 1990: 55); it turned into an outspoken advocate of the Church’s interests
and standpoints. Moreover, literary contributions disappeared slowly but sure-
ly from the publication that had originally functioned as a “magazine for
young, avant-garde authors, such as Eduardo Mallea and Jorge Luis Borges”
(Dolkart 1993: 80-81).
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7 According to Santillán (1960: 95), Osés was born in 1897. He does not provide any
information about his precise birthday or place of birth.
8 The Comisión was an institution sponsored by the Catholic Church to disseminate its
authoritarian concepts and to “create the elite that in its judgement the country needed”
(Rapalo 1990: 53).
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With Osés as its editor Criterio defended the sphere of influence of the
Church vis-à-vis other political and social protagonists and its claim to an
autonomous role in Argentine society. The rise of “Nacionalismo”, the term
Osés initially preferred when referring to European fascism, served as the
point of reference for expressing its matters of concern. For the editor of the
Catholic magazine, fascism’s emphasis on the state was “a false conception of
the life of people” that amounted to “heresy”. It was an ideology completely
unacceptable for the Church, since it was “pagan, limited, earthly”, and “mate-
rialised man”. By condemning “the nationalist error”, Osés argued moreover,
the Church “not only defended the truth but also freedom. Nobody has the
right to teach that the last word in life is the greatness of the country, the
strength of the nation. These are not supreme concepts.”9
In the same vein, the conflict between the Fascist regime and the Vatican
about the Italian branch of the Acción Católica in general and its role in edu-
cating youth in particular, addressed by the papal encyclical Non abbiamo
bisogno in late June 1931, underlined the ideological abyss that separated fas-
cism and Catholicism. It clearly revealed, an editorial in Criterio stated, the
fundamental differences between the two opponents:
Los filósofos del fascismo, tipo [Giovanni] Gentile, han procurado darle con-
tenido ideológico a esa fuerza política, que en principio fue tan sólo un movimien-
to de reacción contra el liberalismo y el comunismo. Y sólo han logrado quintaes-
enciar un concepto: el nacionalismo que, llevado a sus extremas consecuencias cae
en la condenación del Syllabus.…Sostener esa posición, como lo hace el Duce,
implica una tiranía sin límites, que se iguala a la bolchevique.10
The only “divine truths”, the editor of the Catholic magazine affirmed, could
be found in the teachings of the Church, which had “to be accepted formally
and unreservedly.”11
During his editorship, Criterio also voiced its low opinion of Adolf Hitler,
notwithstanding Osés’s beginning anti-Semitism (Rapalo 1990: 66, n. 66). In
1931 it described the leader of the German National Socialists as “a profes-
sional agitator” whose “talents as ruler have to remain, luckily for Europe,
unused (inéditos)” (as quoted in Montserrat 1998: 18). At the time, Osés still
searched for his heroes in the Argentine. Like the small group of militant
Nacionalistas organised in the Liga Republicana (an offspring of the journal
La Nueva República) (Buchrucker 1982: 89-91; Barbero / Devoto 1983: 149-
16 Marcus Klein
9 Criterio 20 March 1930: 371.
10 Criterio 16 July 1931: 73-74, italics in the original.
11 Criterio 24 March 1932: 373.
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153; Devoto 2002: 159-205), he found his idol in José F. Uriburu, the retired
army general and member of the traditional oligarchy who led the “Revolution
of 1930”, as its apologists called the military coup against the democratically
elected government of Yrigoyen. The Catholic magazine “emphatically cele-
brated the triumph” over the historical leader of the Unión Cívica Radical
(Zanatta 1996: 51-52). In accordance with its marked anti-democratic attitude,
it subsequently endorsed the tentative proposals of the provisional government
that aimed at the restriction of the franchise as well as the abolition of parlia-
mentary democracy, which should be replaced by a corporatist order. Some of
Criterio’s backers, namely Joaquín de Anchorena, Ernesto Bosch, and Enrique
Santamarina, even assumed important roles in the revolutionary regime (Rapalo
1990: 53).
Given its anti-democratic basic convictions, its institutional links with the
Church, as well as its close relations with the traditional oligarchy, which
again had assumed power after September 1930, it came as no surprise that
Criterio was not happy about the relatively quick end of the Uriburu regime.
From its point of view this development was particularly troubling because it
had brought about an “enhanced role for the church in Argentine institutions”
(Dolkart 1993: 81). Since the return of democratic rule, albeit one controlled
by the oligarchy, was unavoidable –the putative revolutionary leader failed to
ensure enough support for his corporatist proposal (Klein 2002: 12-13)–, Cri-
terio endorsed General Agustín P. Justo (1932-1938). Uriburu’s co-conspirator
and successor in the Casa Rosada, who was elected in a contest marred by
electoral fraud and voter intimidation, was seen as the best option to defend
the Church’s regained strength. Justo was the person, Osés pointed out after
his inauguration in mid-February 1932, on whom hopes were pinned: “The
people do not expect anything from parliament and everything from the new
president.”12
With this positive attitude the editor of the Catholic magazine expressed a
position that was at variance with the militant nacionalista camp. Seeing Justo
“as an agent of the oligarchy and enemy of Uriburu” who had deceived his
comrade-in-arms, it only “unhappily acquiesced in his victory” (Mc Gee
Deutsch 1999: 204). Osés needed more time to realise that Justo did not intend
to carry out Uriburu’s (dubious) revolutionary objectives. Yet once he had
reached this point Osés emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the
president and the conservative sectors backing him. And he also left behind
his earlier life as a “devout representative of a social reformism” that was
based on the papal social encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragessimo
The Political Lives and Times of Enrique P. Osés 17
12 Criterio 18 Feb. 1932: 202.
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Anno.13 He became an ardent admirer of European fascism in general and
Hitler in particular, a man Criterio had criticised so strongly under his editor-
ship. With the move to Crisol, the nacionalista daily he took over in June
1932, he began a new phase in his intellectual and political career.
¡Heil Hitler!
During the first four months of its existence Crisol, founded in February 1932,
had focused on the activities of the Acción Católica Argentina, announcing its
meetings and public manifestations and reproducing its statements and decla-
rations. The various nacionalista groups, most notably the Legión Cívica
Argentina, the strongest and most significant organisation of the early 1930s
(Cerdeira et al. 1989; Klein 2002), were hardly mentioned in the daily, on the
other hand. After Osés assumed sole responsibility for the programmatic ori-
entation of the newspaper,14 the situation changed dramatically, suggesting
that a rift, which also had probably led to his replacement at Criterio, had
opened between the former editor of the Catholic journal and the Catholic lay-
organisation controlling it. Crisol became the mouthpiece of the “more stri-
dent voices” within the nacionalista camp (Dolkart 1993: 72). Reports about
their meetings prominently featured in its pages, and leading Nacionalistas
wrote “with a certain regularity” in it (Zuleta Alvarez 1975: 285).
At the same time Osés, a gifted journalist who “distinguished himself by
the mordant violence of his sarcasm” (Zuleta Alvarez 1975: 285), emerged as
a representative of the more radical currents of the movement; he became “a
virulent opponent of the oligarchy and therefore of the Justo government”
(Dolkart 1993: 72). He particularly criticized that Justo and the traditional
elite, after having “fiddled with (falsificó) the revolution of September”,
defended “the institutional normality” with all possible “transgressions” (Osés
1937: 18).15 For Osés, who held the opinion that liberal democracy had been
responsible for the destruction of the basic values and pillars of the Argentine
nation –the family, corporations, and the Church16–, the defence of a parlia-
mentary regime based on political parties and the Sáenz Peña Law was unac-
ceptable and only furthered the decline of “a virile people.”17 It was, he argued
in 1936,
18 Marcus Klein
13 Buchrucker (1982: 191); for encyclicals, see Criterio 5 May 1932: 127.
14 Crisol 10 June 1932: 1.
15 The booklet reproduced a series of editorials Osés had published in Crisol in August 1937.
16 Crisol 15 April 1936: 1.
17 Osés (1937: 24).
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un régimen falso, de espaldas al bienestar verdadero de la República, y mediante el
cual, todos los desbordes políticos –fraudes, violencias, coacciones, chanchullos
electorales, avasallamiento de autonomías provinciales, sometimiento claudicante
del P[oder] E[jecutivo] a un Congreso que no representa sino intereses partidarios–
son posibles y, además, inevitables.18
By adhering to it, the conservative sectors and the president betrayed “the
moral and material interests of the fatherland.”19
From the point of view of the editor of Crisol a direct and palpable result
of this unwillingness to change course and completely break with the liberal
traditions was the rise of “the red social subversion”,20 a term invariably cov-
ering all manifestations of leftist and progressive politics in Osés’s, and other
Nacionalista’s, universe. The Justo administration was the main culprit,
notwithstanding the fact that it “never flinched from using repression against
the [trade] unions” (Rock 1993: 183). Osés tirelessly asserted that the conser-
vative government, although it “perfectly” knew that “social discipline” had to
come from above, had not taken “any single decisive measure” to “contain the
reds”. Because of this “complicity” communist agitators had infiltrated
schools, the universities, trade unions, and the agricultural sector.21 Crucially,
this “work of Soviet penetration” further undermined “the spirit” of the Argen-
tine nation, already weakened by liberalism.22
Like other leading Nacionalistas, for instance the virulently anti-Semitic
Carlos Silveyra, on more than one occasion Osés maintained that the leaders
of trade unions, which he denounced as “costly, bureaucratic organisations or
dangerous bunches of murderers”, were directly paid by Moscow.23 Such
statements did not only underline his obsession with leftist subversion; they
also revealed his general distrust of the (organised) working class, sporadic
statements to the contrary notwithstanding.24 At the same time, they betrayed
his initial lack of concern (and interest in) social problems. Only during the
late 1930s the demands for social justice, which went hand in hand with the
toning down of his elitist discourse, became an integral part of his worldview.
In this respect Osés underwent a development similar to that of the Civic
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18 Osés (1936: 19). The booklet reproduced a series of editorials Osés had published in
Crisol in March and April 1936.
19 Osés (1937: 28).
20 Osés (1936: 27).
21 Osés (1936: 27 and 18).
22 Osés (1936: 17).
23 Crisol 28 June 1934, as quoted in Buchrucker (1982: 225-226); for Silveyra, see Sil-
veyra (1933); (1936).
24 See Buchrucker 1982: 226.
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Legion, which also assumed more radical and populist positions as the decade
progressed (Klein 2002: 20-23).25
By the mid-1930s, after having remained conspicuously silent about the
signing of the Roca-Runciman treaty between Great Britain and Argentina in
1933 (Zuleta Alvarez 1975: 285), which “[m]any Argentines perceived…as a
humiliating display of national subservience” and as an move that “protected
the core of the elite, the cattle fatteners, at a high cost to the rest of society”
(Mc Gee Deutsch 1999: 205), Osés took up the idea of economic dependency.
Like the overwhelming majority of Nacionalistas he belatedly followed the
argumentation developed by Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta in their landmark book
about the relationship between Argentina and Britain, written in 1934 in
response to the pact.26 Once he had appropriated their accusations, he again
displayed his typical verbal aggressiveness. He attacked “the great extra-
national forces of monopolistic (trustificada) capital” that, with the support of
its Argentine allies, the traditional oligarchy, had been organised “for the
absorption of our material wealth”.27 Through Crisol he also proposed to
nationalise “all ‘trusts’ and public utility companies”, which were, to a large
extent, British-owned.28
The criticism of foreign-owned companies and the idea that “the depend-
ent nations of Latin America”, not least the Argentine, “should be part of the
fascist revolutionary international” “against the Western democratic powers”
that only exploited them (Spektorowski 2003: 126), went hand in hand with
demands for greater economic self-sufficiency.29 Despite these proposals, the
break with Argentina’s economic liberal tradition was not complete, though.
Osés’s (rare) statements on economic issues still betrayed the strength and
lasting influence of the traditions he criticised so vehemently. For one, he
never questioned the capitalist organisation of the country’s economy as such.
Crisol “continued to oppose economic planning for being too close to ‘state
socialism’” (Rock 1995: 121). Nor did he propose a policy of industrialisation,
which could have reduced the country’s dependency on the agricultural sector.
20 Marcus Klein
25 At the same time, he never changed his traditionalist position concerning women. His
paper strongly opposed female suffrage (Buchrucker 1982: 215), and “described the
growing numbers of women entering the labor force as an ‘invasion’ and ‘an inversion
of Christian society’” (Crisol 12 June 1936, as quoted in Rock 1995: 110). Juan E.
Carulla, the editor of Bandera Argentina, wholeheartedly shared Osés’s reservations as
regards women (Rock 1995: 80).
26 Irazusta (1934). For assessment of the book and contemporary reactions to it, see Quat-
trocchi-Woisson (1995: 106-125).
27 Osés (1937: 28 and 8).
28 Crisol 18 Oct. 1936: 3.
29 Crisol 18 Oct. 1936: 1.
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Indeed, Osés praised “the man of the country” as the “producer” of the nation’s
wealth.30
His thoughts on the economic crisis that the country experienced in the
early 1930s as a result of the Great Depression did not betray any attempt of
analysis. He simply put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Jews. Was-
n’t “the entire modern, barbarous and suicidal capitalist system”, he asked in
late 1932, “the most monstrous conjunction of interests of the immense Jewish
autocracy, which can only live on the misery of the majority”?31 For Osés, the
answer to this rhetorical question was obvious. Adopting a position commonly
shared by other radical Argentine anti-Semites of the 1930s, for instance the
former socialist Ramón Doll (Spektorowski 1993: 105-108), he asserted that
capitalism was in fact only one instrument in a vast Jewish conspiracy that
ultimately strove for the “domination of the world”. Everything was geared to
“the advent of the Soviet regime”, “the pinnacle of Jewish imperialism”. The
plan, which had been laid down in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, would
“be fulfilled inexorably”.32
Through Crisol, the self-styled “anti-Jewish newspaper” that “published
scurrilous lies in its ‘Jewish news column’” (Mc Gee Deutsch 1986: 115),
Osés wanted to draw attention to what he saw as a mortal danger for the coun-
try. Accordingly, he did not shy away from disseminating venomous false-
hoods about the Jewish community. Osés consistently exaggerated the number
of Jews living in the country,33 and tirelessly warned of the “Jewish invasion
of our fatherland”, especially by refugees coming from Central and Eastern
Europe, and the infiltration of the armed forces.34 Moreover Osés, who as
early as October 1932 defended the “bloody persecution” of Jews as a legiti-
mate means in the struggle against an “overbearing invader”,35 did not show
any restraint in his proposals regarding the treatment of Argentina’s Jews. In
October 1936 he proposed, for example, to deprive them of fundamental civil
rights, including citizenship, and asked for the establishment of ghettos and
the introduction of identification signs. Ultimately, he wanted their expulsion
from the country.36
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30 Crisol 19 Aug. 1934, as quoted in Rock 1995: 102.
31 Crisol 2 Oct. 1932: 1.
32 Crisol 2 Oct. 1932: 1.
33 Crisol 6 May 1936: 1. He asserted that up to 1.5 million Jews lived in the Argentine
(around ten per cent of the population) while in reality there were only 250,000 (or less
than two per cent).
34 Crisol 6 May 1936: 1; 27 March 1936: 1 and 3.
35 Crisol 2 Oct. 1932: 1.
36 Crisol 18 Oct. 1936: 3; (Buchrucker 1982: 243). Even some leading Catholic Naciona-
listas, most notably the priest Gustavo Franceschi, Osés’s successor as editor of Criterio
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It should come as no surprise that Osés justified every single anti-Semitic
measure of the Third Reich against the “wicked race.”37 Indeed, while most
Nacionalistas and “essentially all nationalist publications” assumed a friendly
attitude towards Nazi Germany, with Crisol Osés “surpassed all his col-
leagues” (Buchrucker 1982: 295); he never hid his respect for Hitler, and
repeatedly hailed him as a role model. Reacting to the “Night of the Long
Knives” in mid-1934, which had culminated in the assassination of the
Fuhrer’s opponents, in an editorial titled “Heil Hitler!” the self-declared
“National Socialist” (Zuleta Alvarez 1975: 286) unreservedly defended the
events. Osés stated that in
En Hitler se ataca el triunfo paulatino, pero seguro, de un régimen de afirmación
nacionalista, que trueca todos los valores falsos, todos los falsos ídolos antes adora-
dos. En Hitler se ataca al hombre que representa, indiscutiblemente, un anhelo de
superación del siglo que aún lleva a cuestas los fardos del pasado. En Hitler se com-
bate todo ese ejemplo de esperanzas que hace vibrar a los pueblos hoy, desengaña-
dos de la democracia política, del capitalismo judío, de la anarquía social, de la lib-
ertad…para que la gocen unos cuantos cientos o miles de privilegiados.38
Osés’s paper, which described itself in the local organ of the German Nazi
party, the Mitteilungsblatt der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-
partei-Landesgruppe Argentinien (as of 1934 named Der Trommler), as the
“only Argentine daily that openly and honestly speaks up for Hitler’s Ger-
many” (Ebel 1971: 90, n. 40), praised Mussolini and Italian Fascism in a simi-
lar way (Buchrucker 1982: 265). After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War
in July 1936, which lastingly polarised the country in general and the intellec-
tual field in particular between supporters of the Spanish Republic and the
defenders of the nationalist Insurrectionists (Falcoff 1982; Trifone / Svarzman
1993), Francisco Franco received the same favourable treatment as the two
fascist dictators. Osés supported his cause through Crisol. Together with other
prominent Nacionalistas, namely Manuel Gálvez, Delfina Bunge de Gálvez,
Carlos and Federico Ibarguren, he also joined the pro-Franco group Socorro
Blanco Argentina pro Reconstrucción de España (Quijada 1991: 29 and 179),
set up “to gather funds to help Nationalist Spain confront ‘the diabolic forces
of Communism’” (Falcoff 1982: 313).
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and himself no friend of Jews, rejected these suggestions as too radical (Senkman 1991:
130). For Franceschi’s attitude towards Jews, see Metz (1993). For a general discussion
of the anti-Semitism of the nacionalista movement during the period under considera-
tion, see Lvovich (2001; 2003: 237-371).
37 Crisol 11 Nov. 1938: 1. On this occasion Osés justified the Crystal Night.
38 Crisol 1 July 1934: 1.
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In the ideologically charged atmosphere of the 1930s the “profound sym-
pathy for the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists”,39 which Osés’s paper
repeatedly expressed, led to accusations that the European fascists financially
supported Crisol in particular and the nacionalista movement in general.
Crisol vehemently rejected these attacks. It averred that Hitler and Mussolini
did not interfere in Argentine affairs –unlike Stalin, who “is stirring up all the
enemies [of] the fatherland.”40 Yet, notwithstanding these claims, the paper
did in fact benefit from German as well as Italian support. Just as the other
leading nacionalista daily, Juan Carulla’s Bandera Argentina, Osés’s paper
regularly received articles of the Hamburg-based Aufklärungsausschuss, a
subsidiary organisation of Joseph Goebbels’s ministry of popular enlighten-
ment and propaganda that prepared articles in which the National Socialist
ideology and German politics were explained and defended, as well as wires
of the German news agency Transocean. They were delivered free of charge,
but Osés, who personally received them, did not get paid for publishing these
predominantly anti-Communist and anti-Semitic articles in Crisol (Müller
1997: 263-265 and 276).41 In addition to articles, the Italian Embassy also
granted “small subsidies” (Zanatta 1996: 284).
As far as the Germans were concerned, the main reason for the sparing
support of Crisol was its limited influence on Argentine public opinion. The
German Embassy appreciated the daily’s outspoken defence of the Third
Reich’s policies, as for example in the aftermath of the Anschluss of Austria in
March 1938.42 At the same time, however, it did not fail to stress its insuffi-
cient scope and relevance (Ebel 1971: 343). This interference also applied to
other pro-German nacionalista papers, such as Bandera Argentina, and the
nacionalista movement in general.43 After reaching its peak during Uriburu’s
short-lived revolutionary regime, the number of militants organised in the var-
ious factions –in October 1933, Wilhelm Lütge, a representative of the Ger-
man Legation in Buenos Aires, estimated that approximately thirty different
groups were active– declined sharply.44 Personal enmities, the lack of a gener-
ally accepted leader, and programmatic differences meant that, from the point
of the view of the Nacionalistas, the situation did not improve during the
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39 Crisol, 28 June 1935: 1.
40 Crisol 28 June 1935: 1 and 4.
41 During the first 18 days of January 1935 Crisol published, for instance, 19 articles of the
Aufklärungsausschuss and between 1 November 1938 and 31 March 1939 64 articles.
See Müller (1997: 266) and Ebel (1971: 90, n. 40), respectively.
42 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn/Berlin (PA AA) (1938).
43 See PA AA (1933); (1935); (1936).
44 Wiener Library (1933).
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course of the 1930s. Crisol’s weakness reflected, then, only the generally fee-
ble state of the self-declared saviours of the Argentine nation.
Osés was partly responsible for this situation; his radicalism alienated a
potential ally in his struggle against the liberal order and communism, the
Catholic Church, which exercised considerable influence on important sectors
of Nacionalismo during the 1930s. Because of his open and outspoken admi-
ration of European fascism, which implied the defence of a totalitarian regime
in Argentina that would put an end to “the absurd and insidious liberal division
of the Three Powers”,45 the Argentine hierarchy “distanced itself from Osés
and his position since 1935” (Ben-Dror 1996: 130, n. 85; see also 2003: 153-
154). His commitment to the introduction of “Catholic and nationalist” curric-
ula at all levels of the education system,46 and the protestations that “the
Church constitutes the soul of the Nation” and that the nacionalista movement
did “not want to succeed, nor rule, nor reign without Christ”,47 counted for lit-
tle. Crisol’s comments about the role of the Church in the new nacionalista
order indicated in fact that Osés now embraced a position that he had attacked
as editor of Criterio, namely the primacy of politics.48
His lack of political vision and intransigence also weakened Nacionalismo.
Throughout the decade the editor of Crisol did not set out, for example, how
the movement –“this force that [was] still divided into factions and legions”49–
could be united. Moreover, until the late 1930s Osés never joined any group,
nor did he make any serious efforts to establish his own faction, nor did he
actively seek the unification of the different nacionalista organisations under
one leadership, not even his own.50 Rather, while deploring the lack of a unify-
ing figure, he torpedoed attempts to find a generally accepted leader after the
death of Uriburu in April 1932.51 When Juan Bautista Molina, a close collabo-
rator of Uriburu, the driving force behind the establishment of the Civic
Legion, and a leading Nacionalista within the armed forces, was named as a
possible contender, he rejected him. Osés argued that his position as an active
military officer ruled him out for this role.52 His objection to Molina’s repeat-
ed attempts to assume power by means of a military coup (Buchrucker 1982:
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45 Crisol 15 April 1936: 3.
46 Crisol 18 Oct. 1936: 3.
47 Crisol 29 March 1935: 1.
48 Crisol 15 April 1936: 3.
49 Crisol 6 Jan. 1936: 1.
50 In the 1930s Osés only enjoyed the unconditional support of the Asociación de Amigos
de Crisol, an organisation that defined the dissemination of the paper as its main aim.
Crisol 19 April 1936: 1.
51 Osés (1936: 34-35).
52 Crisol 28 Dec. 1933: 1.
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304-305) only increased the enmity between the two prominent Nacionalistas;
these personal animosities would haunt the movement until the early-1940s,
complicating any effort to reach an understanding within the more extreme
sectors of Nacionalismo.
In addition, Osés never convincingly expounded how the estranged move-
ment should assume power. For the editor of Crisol, the formation of a party,
and the direct participation in the electoral process, was not a viable option.
He denounced those nacionalista groups that (unsuccessfully) nominated can-
didates for national elections, for instance José María Rosa’s Nacionalismo
Laborista, as bad imitations of political parties that had nothing to do with the
movement.53 Expressing an attitude shared by the overwhelming majority of
Nacionalistas, he endorsed the blank vote instead. Osés argued that
El Nacionalismo, votando en blanco, mata dos pájaros de un tiro. Rechaza los
fórmulas que se le presentan, por contrarias al bienestar moral y material y al por-
venir de la República. Y certifica una vez más, que los nacionalistas estamos de
vuelta de toda la farsa democrática con que se sigue embaucando a los argentinos
sin nada en la cabeza y en el corazón, y que no se puede contar con nosotros, para
una mentira más, de la que el único perjudicado, el único pato de la boda, será el
pueblo, al final de las cuentas de siempre.54
His explanations notwithstanding, it remained unclear why this practice
furthered the interests of the movement. Given the declining number of mili-
tants, it was highly unlikely that the few blank votes cast by Nacionalistas
could lastingly have undermined the legitimacy of the conservative regime.
Nor could the modest results be presented as a propagandistic victory.55
On the eve of the Second World War Osés’s position within the nacionalista
camp was, then, not as dominating as some of his followers subsequently
claimed. As the editor of the most radical nacionalista daily he certainly influ-
enced some sectors of the movement, but it was not “decisively directed” by
him (Samyn Ducó 1978: 62). Tellingly, he did not play any role in the founda-
tion of the Alianza de la Juventud Nacionalista (AJN), an offspring of the Civic
Legion’s youth organisation that, set up in September 1937, developed into the
strongest faction of the late 1930s and early 1940s (Klein 2001). The establish-
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53 Crisol 6 Jan. 1935: 1. In 1936 Nacionalismo Laborista nominated candidates for the
elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Federal Capital, receiving 1,681 votes
(0,10% of the total national vote, or 0,46% of the votes cast in the city of Buenos Aires).
See Cantón (1968: 115-116). Juan Carulla and Bandera Argentina endorsed Rosa, and
they therefore also incurred Osés’s wrath. See the editorial in Crisol 1 Jan. 1935: 1.
54 Osés (1937: 18).
55 I would like to thank Federico Finchelstein for making this point.
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ment of El Pampero in November 1939 would change this situation, albeit only
partly. With a circulation of 50,000 three years after its foundation, it clearly
overshadowed all other nacionalista publications.56 Because of its strength Osés,
who remained owner of Crisol, had an unprecedented platform for the realisa-
tion of his personal aspirations that he began to formulate more forcefully. At the
same time, his outspoken support of Nazi Germany’s war aims and the well-
documented collaboration with the Third Reich, which bankrolled the paper,
undermined his standing and branded him as one of the leading public enemies.
In the Service of the Anti-Argentine Propaganda
Although Osés officially signed as the founder of El Pampero, and assumed
its editorship, the decision to set up the paper was taken in Berlin soon after
the outbreak of the war. Reacting to its diplomats’ earlier complaints about the
inefficiency of the presentation of German interests in the media and the pre-
dominantly anti-German and pro-British attitude of the public as well as the
country’s opinion leaders after Britain’s and France’s declaration of war (New-
ton 1992: 222-223), the Auswärtiges Amt, which had taken over the responsi-
bility for the foreign propaganda of the Third Reich from the ministry of pop-
ular enlightenment and propaganda in September 1939, took the initiative. It
would no longer rely on the articles the Aufklärungsausschuss and Transocean
had provided for years to “second-class papers”, not least Crisol. It launched
its own daily. Using “considerable funds”, El Pampero appeared on the news-
stands in early November 1939 (Müller 1997: 273).57
Not surprisingly, over the next years the German Embassy in Buenos Aires
did not fail to single out the publication as the only “representative of our
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56 Navarro Gerassi (1968: 155) states, El Pampero reached a circulation of 75,000 in the
early 1940s. Bandera Argentina was the second strongest paper with 7,000 copies;
Crisol only printed 4,000 copies at the time. Although Navarro Gerassi does not indicate
her source –she only refers to the findings of the Chamber of Deputies’ Comisión Espe-
cial Investigadora de Actividades Antiargentinas–, she seems to rely on documents that
can be found in Archivo Político de la Cámara de Diputados, Comisión Especial Inves-
tigadora de Actividades Antiargentinas, Buenos Aires (APCD/CEIAA) (n/d a). These
carbon copies have to be treated with some caution, as they do not contain any informa-
tion about the author, nor the date and the place of publication. For circulation of El
Pampero, see PA AA (1942d): R 29543, Embassy to Auswärtiges Amt, Buenos Aires, 5
Nov. Only surpassed by the 66,000 copies printed on the occasion of its third anniver-
sary, this is the highest regular circulation mentioned in the reports of the Embassy.
57 Frank described “The bond between El Pampero and the Nazi Embassy…like that
between infant and mother” (1944: 128).
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interests” in Argentina. Since the most influential papers, particularly La
Nación, La Prensa, and El Mundo, were “completely inaccessible, not even
for millions (Millionenbeträge)”,58 the survival of Osés’s publication was
guaranteed with all possible means. The shortage of paper, a problem that par-
ticularly troubled the Embassy and threatened to finish the enterprise, was
resolved through the spending of increasing amounts of money.59 The “abun-
dant advertising” of German firms, for example by Messerschmitt, BMW,
Rheinmetall, and Zeiss-Ikon (Rouquié (1981: 297, n. 13), also helped to keep
the daily alive. Reflecting its importance for the Germans, even after the
Comisión Especial Investigadora de Actividades Antiargentinas of the Cham-
ber of Deputies had revealed the financial support of Berlin for El Pampero in
September 1941 and described it as “the paper in the service of the anti-Argen-
tine propaganda”,60 the diplomatic representation of the Third Reich doubled
its efforts. It took measures to establish a printery for the newspaper.61
From the point of view of the German diplomats as well as the officials at
the Auswärtiges Amt the money was obviously well spent. The circulation
rose, slowly but steadily, and favourably compared with the other nacionalista
papers; El Pampero almost produced as many copies as the smaller main-
stream dailies, for instance the morning paper El Diario (80,000) and the
evening paper La Razón (81,000) (Heide 1940: col. 247). Even more impor-
tant was however that with its “violent and personal attacks” the paper went
“far to influence public opinion”, as the British Embassy, which denounced
the German investments in the publication as early as January 1940, grudging-
ly conceded.62 Thus, while El Pampero may have been “the most scurrilous
paper on this side of the Atlantic”, as one contemporary stated, it was also an
effective one.63
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58 PA AA (1940).
59 PA AA (1942a); (1942e).
60 Cámara de Diputados (1941: 657). Heinrich Volberg, who played a well-known and cru-
cial role in bankrolling the paper through the Oficina de Fomento del Comercio Alemán,
a subsidiary organisation of the German Embassy, subsequently stated that the figures
indicated by the Commission were too low (Volbert 1981: 141). Unfortunately he did
not state how much money El Pampero actually received.
61 PA AA (1942e).
62 Public Record Office, Foreign Office, London (PRO/FO) (1940b). For denunciation,
see PRO/FO (1940a).
63 El Pampero would soon hold “the record for all Argentine papers in suspensions by the
government” (Loewenstein 1943: 1270, n. 22); by 1942 it had “been sued fifty-eight
times for libel, calumny, contempt, [and] extortion”; and Osés was repeatedly arrested
for obscenity, as for example in July 1940, “for printing an acrostic lampoon of Winston
Churchill; the first letters of each line combined to read ‘One must be English to be a
son of a whore’” (Riesman 1942: 1122, n. 175).
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Osés deserved the credit for these questionable achievements. In the viru-
lently anti-Semitic admirer of Hitler and restless defender of the Axis the Ger-
mans had a willing, able, and reliable collaborator who presented their views,
which he wholeheartedly shared, aggressively and uncompromisingly.
Employing Nazi-style vocabulary, El Pampero, the self-declared “arch-Cre-
ole” newspaper (Rouquié 1981: 297), did not grow weary of justifying Ger-
many’s war of aggression. A few days after the invasion of the Soviet Union in
June 1941, for instance, an article praised Hitler as the saviour of “Christian
civilisation”. It maintained, “only one clear, single truth arises from this new
and colossal aspect of the European war”:
El gesto enorme de Hitler de acometer la Rusia comunista, después de haber
procurado, por todos los medios, contener a la Bestia roja en sus intenciones de
subyugamiento (sic) de Europa.…Rusia, el anticristo, será derrotado por Europa. E
Hitler, el Fuhrer del Tercer Reich, es el genio, que en el momento más crítico de la
historia de Occidente, gana para su Nación, una vez más la gloría que nadie podrá
quitarle en adelante: de haber salvado la civilización cristiana, que es la nuestra, a
la que no podemos renunciar sin renegar de nosotros mismos.64
Joyous reports on the victories and advances of Germany and Japan on the one
hand, and gloating articles about the putative retreats and defeats of the Allies
on the other, further underlined the sympathies of the paper.65
The constant attacks on the two western democracies, and increasingly the
USA, was another aspect of El Pampero’s role as the “official Argentine
spokesman for the Axis in foreign policy” (Rennie 1945: 277). Osés asserted
that Britain, “H[er] M[ajesty] the Robbery”, was not fighting for Argentina, as
its sympathisers tirelessly stated. It only fought “[f]or the survival of the regime
of democratic oppression that it has imposed on the world”.66 The United States
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the “paralytic and megalomaniac slave of
the Jews”,67 were treated with no less contempt. The Good Neighbour policy,
with its appeal to the common interests of the liberal democracies and “conti-
nental unity”, was denounced as a means of “the democratic imperialism of
North America” to secure its domination of South America in general and
Argentina in particular.68 The underlying objective was, Osés maintained, the
replacement of Britain as “the hegemonic power in the Argentine.”69 These
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64 El Pampero 26 June 1941: 9.
65 El Pampero 28 Dec. 1941: 1-3.
66 Osés (1941b: 47).
67 Osés (1941a: 3 and 2). The booklet partly reproduced three speeches Osés had given in
San Rafael, San Juan, and Mendoza, published in Crisol on 1 May 1941.
68 Osés (1941b: 35).
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attacks on the USA and the “‘criminal war-mongering’ of Mr. Roosevelt…had”,
as the British Embassy conceded, “some effect, with the result that the open
partisanship of the United States while increasing belief in our ultimate victory,
has probably not increased sympathy with our cause.”70
At least as far as the impact on the overwhelmingly pro-British attitude of
the Argentine population was concerned, Osés, if he had been aware of this
assessment by one of his archenemies, would have been pleased with himself.
At the same time, he must have realised however that Britain’s overall position
vis-à-vis the Third Reich did indeed improve because of the alliance with Wash-
ington; and this development certainly did not find his approval. Probably more
than any other Nacionalista, the editor of El Pampero hoped for a victory of the
Axis, as its triumph would have vindicated his collaboration with the Third
Reich. The impassioned defence of Hitler’s Germany even overshadowed his
public support of Argentina’s neutrality in the conflict, a position officially
adopted by the Argentine government immediately after the outbreak of the war
and widely supported by the nacionalista movement.71 As against the majority
of his fellow Nacionalistas, not least the Alianza of Juan Queraltó, Osés was
certainly more inclined towards the Axis (Navarro Gerassi 1968: 140-141).
Because of his blatantly pro-Nazi attitude, leftist members of parliament
repeatedly, albeit unsuccessfully, called for the definite closure of El Pampero,
for instance in the (Argentine) winter of 1942.72 Yet, some Nacionalistas also
strongly objected to his open admiration of the fascist dictators. They
denounced the editor of the leading nacionalista paper as the prolonged arm of
foreign interests in the country. Guillermo Carrizo, a representative of the
Irazusta brothers and Palacio’s Partido Libertador in Córdoba, stated for
example that Osés’s views were both anti-democratic and anti-Argentine, and
“a dangerous deviation, not only ideologically but also morally” (as quoted in
Piñeiro 1997: 193). In the same vein, Rodolfo Irazusta had Osés in mind when
he stated that those who “excessively admire Hitler, Mussolini or Franco, and
even admit the significance of their respective movements in our land”, could
not claim to be Nacionalistas. In order to be successful, the movement had to
achieve “total autonomy” from “foreign nationalists”.73
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71 A notable exception was the journal Nuevo Orden, edited by Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta
as well as Ernesto Palacio, which rejected this position, arguing that it only favoured
Great Britain. See, for instance, Irazusta (1993: 161 and 164), originally published in
Nuevo Orden, 25 March 1942.
72 PA AA (1942b).
73 Irazusta (1993: 161 and 163). The statements had originally been published in Nuevo
Orden, 25 March 1942.
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As far as Irazusta was concerned, Osés’s ideational closeness to the Euro-
pean dictators, and sympathies for them, were not his only sins. He also criti-
cised his lack of political vision; the formation of a political party and the
participation in the electoral process was still not a feasible option for the edi-
tor of El Pampero. Repeating earlier statements, he asserted, “the nacional-
ista conscience” “rejected the current electoral regime as a means of [its]
struggle, as a tool for the attainment of [its] objectives”, because they were
“one of the main reasons for the sufferings”’ of the nation.74 For Osés, who
stated with some justification that the “immense majority of Nacionalistas”
shared his position, it was the “conservatism” of the Irazustas, who advocated
the “gradual conquest of electoral positions”, that amounted to a sell-out to
the traditional oligarchy.75 In accordance with this position, when the Partido
Libertador (unsuccessfully) nominated candidates for the provincial election
in Entre Ríos in March 1943, an acrimonious confrontation between its and
Osés’s followers, who endorsed the blank vote, characterised the election
campaign.76
At the same time, Osés also voiced his opposition to another putsch that
Molina, the de facto leader of the Alianza, advocated and repeatedly, albeit
with success, attempted (Potash 1969: 149-152; Rouquié 1981: 324-325).
Alluding to the “Revolution of 1930”, Osés described this nacionalista current
as “septembrismo”77 or as “the old molinista trend.”78 While being close to
“the true nature (lo esencial)” of Nacionalismo, it pursued an equally misguid-
ed strategy;79 it distracted the energy of the Argentine youth from “the ardu-
ous, slow and sacrificing nacionalista objective” of establishing Nacionalismo
“as a national expression, as a collective opinion, as a patriotic vote”, as a
“Movement of souls.”80 Moreover, it wanted to carry out the “‘revolutionary
coup’ even with the…men…of September” 1930, ignoring that the situation
had fundamentally changed since the days of Uriburu. They “made Septem-
ber”, passed the period of “institutional normality” and now spent “the present
time in their positions. Yet, they have not got in touch with reality. They have
not worked out the meaning –unknown to them– of Nacionalismo.”81
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74 Osés (1941b: 58).
75 Osés (1941b: 61 and 74).
76 The Partido Libertador received 1,148 votes, and the supporters of the blank vote 1,929.
Together the two factions obtained less than one per cent of the overall vote. For a dis-
cussion of the party, Piñeiro (1997: 184-204).
77 Osés (1941b: 73).
78 APCD/CEIAA (1941a).
79 Osés (1941b: 73).
80 Osés (1941b: 49 and 57).
81 Osés (1941b: 48 and 84).
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As against the Irazusta brothers, Molina, as well as Fresco, who “aspired to
form a bridge between conservatism and Nacionalismo” and therefore
incurred Osés’s hatred (Dolkart 1993: 84), the self-declared “First Comrade”82
knew the true meaning of the movement and the desires of its followers. The
Nacionalistas wanted, above all, to bring together the varying factions.83 In
view of this fundamental necessity, which would create the prerequisites for
the emergence of a truly “National Movement”, the decision about the appro-
priate means to achieve power was of secondary importance, Osés asserted.
Only after the Nacionalistas had won over the majority of the population they
would make up their minds. Then, they would decide whether they participat-
ed in the electoral process or staged a coup, or took any other unspecified
measure that guaranteed the realisation of their dream:84 a totalitarian regime
that, based on corporatist representation, would “direct and co-ordinate” the
different “economic interests” and bring about social justice and harmony
between the classes, replacing the “false”, “anti-natural”, and “anti-Christian”
“myths of free-trade liberalism, free and all-embracing private initiative, [and]
individual liberty” that were in mortal decline.85
This discussion within the nacionalista movement about the correct strate-
gy was, as Osés’s personal attacks and his self-portrayal as the “First Com-
rade” indicated, ultimately one about power. Seconded by El Pampero, Osés
increasingly styled himself as the man who was destined to unite “all the
nacionalista aspirations.”86 And “although [he did] appear as the top leader of
Nacionalismo, the reality [was] different.”87 Osés only found vocal support in
the Interior, especially in the provinces of Santa Fe and Mendoza.88 There the
Unión Nacionalista89 praised him as “our Caudillo”90 and “the leader (conduc-
tor) of the new Argentina that arises without politicians and without Jews but
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83 Osés (1941b: 74).
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85 Osés 1(941a: 8-10 and 12).
86 Osés (1941b: 61).
87 APCD/CEIAA (1940b). This assessment is also corroborated by the fact that Osés did
not belong to either the Consejo Superior del Nacionalismo or the Congreso de la Recu-
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88 APCD/CEIAA (1940a); (1942b).
89 It was not possible to ascertain the exact date of the group’s foundation. A Unión
Nacionalista Argentina de Rosario existed at least as early as late 1934. Crisol 1 Jan.
1935: 1, reproducing a speech Osés gave at a meeting of the group. At the time, the fac-
tion did not play a significant role in nacionalista politics.
90 APCD/CEIAA (1941b).
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with social justice.”91 Both Molina and Fresco, who made some significant
inroads into the nacionalista camp despite Osés’s and the Alianza’s consistent
attacks (Klein 2001: 114), were undoubtedly more successful. Molina, cele-
brated as the “Supreme Chief” by the AJN92, and Fresco, the leader of Patria-
Unión Nacional Argentina and “close friend and political supporter” of acting
President Ramón Castillo,93 enjoyed a considerably greater following than
Osés amongst the relatively small number of Nacionalistas (Klein 2001: 115-
116). The Alliance and the National Union dominated nacionalista politics in
the city and in the province of Buenos Aires, the centres of the movement’s
activities in the early 1940s. The Irazusta brothers, on the other hand, only
played only a minor role. Their electoral strategy did not meet with good
response.
Although Osés never officially relinquished his claim to be the “First
Comarade”, in the end he it was who had to rethink his position. By the late
(Argentine) summer of 1941 Osés had accepted that, in view of the weak pop-
ular support of the movement and the bleak prospects of changing this situa-
tion in the foreseeable future, the formation of a truly “National Movement”
along the lines outlined by him was no longer a feasible option; the attempt to
broaden the appeal of Nacionalismo by “going to the people”94 –a renuncia-
tion of his previous élitism and anti-popular attitude– and to emerge as the
undisputed leader of this unified movement had failed. Overcoming his earlier
reservations, which reflected his concern that the collaboration with the armed
forces would invariably lead to the marginalisation of the civilian nacionalista
groups, repeating the experience of the revolution of 1930,95 El Pampero made
“common cause with the military nationalists” (Rouquié 1981: 310).
The co-operation with this sector, which shared the civilian Nacionalistas’
anti-political, anti-democratic, anti-oligarchic, and pro-neutral convictions,
went hand in hand with a rapprochement between Osés and the Alianza, the
group that for some time had focused its energies on winning new adherents
within the armed forces.96 His presence at the rally organised by the AJN on
Labour Day 1942, an event that on earlier occasions El Pampero had only
benevolently announced and commented on, underlined the newly achieved
amity.97 Yet, in spite of the positive echo his appearance had, not least on the
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93 PRO/FO (1943).
94 Osés (1941b: 97).
95 Osés (1941a: 4-5).
96 PRO/FO (1941b).
97 El Pampero 5 April 1941: 5; 24 April 1941: 7.
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part of the Alianzistas, this was “an alliance without major commitments of
either sides.”98 The “Supreme Chief” and the “First Comrade”, reflecting their
deep-seated animosities, could not reach an agreement concerning the leader-
ship of a unified faction, and therefore the collaboration was never formally
established.99
According to Osés, the attempt “to unite his forces with those of General
Molina in the mass meeting held on 1 May” was not the result of “the pressure
exerted by the military”. Ramón Castillo it had been who had asked him to
participate in a rally that explicitly endorsed his policy of neutrality.100 The
acting president, an unrepentant conservative of the old school who resisted
the pressure of the United States to break off the diplomatic relations with the
Axis and therefore enjoyed the goodwill of the Third Reich101 as well as the
Alianza (Klein 2001: 112-113), had also assured him of his sympathies for
“the cause that he represented”, the “First Comrade” declared in front of his
followers. Since “the whole country knew”, however, “that the paper he direct-
ed” was “totalitarian”, Castillo told him during a meeting, he “could not use
him”. If he had to rely on a movement, it would be the Unión Nacional
Argentina of Manuel Fresco, who had organised his own rally on Labour Day
in support of the government and Argentine neutrality.102
Osés’s account of events was not as implausible as it might seem. Castillo,
while always trying to keep the nacionalista groups in check, also carefully
cultivated them; he particularly hoped to gain the goodwill of their sympathis-
ers within the armed forces (Senkman 1995: 36-37). Castillo maintained close
contacts with Fresco and was in touch with Molina. His administration’s
restrained attitude vis-à-vis El Pampero fitted into the same pattern. In spite of
its well-document relationship with the German regime, the federal authorities
never took any decisive measures against the most important nacionalista
daily, or his editor. When, for example, the minister of the interior, Miguel J.
Culaciati, suspended the paper in February 1943, its links with the Third Reich
were not an issue.103 Equally telling was that Castillo lifted the closure of the
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daily, which had originally been suspended for an undetermined period of
time, after a few days.104
As the political developments showed soon after the last suspension of El
Pampero, the collaboration between the president and the Nacionalistas in gen-
eral and Osés in particular proved to be conditional and short-lived. When the
armed forces, “tired of election fraud and the air of scandal and racketeering
that pervaded this government”, deposed Castillo on 4 June 1943 and thereby
prevented the election of his handpicked successor, Robustiano Patrón Costas,
“the most powerful of the Tucumán sugar barons” who “was reputed to favor
the Allies, and especially the British” (Rock 1987: 247), the Nacionalistas
showed no compassion for him. They did not rally to his support. Rather, they
warmly welcomed the self-declared saviours of the nation, celebrating the end
of the traditional oligarchy’s dominance over Argentine politics and hoping for
the establishment of a new order under their leadership. Typical of their reac-
tion, “in a triumphant editorial” El Pampero even “declared that a fascist regime
at long last had been established in Argentina” (Loewenstein 1943: 1306).
During the first couple of months Osés and his fellow Nacionalistas had
every reason to be content; the new rulers suppressed communist and demo-
cratic activities and preserved Argentina’s neutrality. After the nacionalista
faction within the armed forces had gained the upper hand over a more moder-
ate current, which favoured the accommodation of the United States, in the
(Argentine) spring of 1943 a series of policy measures were carried out that
raised the enthusiasm of the civilian supporters even further. On two consecu-
tive days in early January 1944, all political parties were dissolved and
Catholic religious education was introduced into the curricula of state schools.
El Pampero, which had already stated that the adoption of the first decision
“had comforted and consolidated the belief in the revolution”, equally warmly
welcomed the second decree. Finally, “the young generations of Argentines,
today disturbed and disorientated by the…atheistic and unpatriotic education
that the state imparts in the compulsory schools” in the general and the chil-
dren of “heretics, Jews and Muslims” in particular would benefit from the
reaffirmation of the Christian and Western concepts of the nation.105
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attacked them as part of its revisionist effort to denigrate the traditional oligarchy and
the liberal hegemony on the one hand, and to vindicate Juan Manuel de Rosas, the 19th-
century dictator, on the other (Quattrocchi-Woisson 1995: 217).
104 The interview he had granted El Pampero a few weeks earlier, in November 1942, could
be interpreted as another example of Castillo’s cautiously benevolent position vis-à-vis
the Nacionalistas. At the time, the paper’s financial support by the Third Reich had long
been revealed. See PA AA (1942e).
105 El Pampero 2/3 Jan. 1944, as quoted in Piñeiro (1997: 250).
SEBASTIANI  10/4/06  09:59  Página 34
As it turned out, this was the last occasion for El Pampero to celebrate.
The dissolution of all nacionalista groups and the rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions with the Axis powers in late January 1944, a consequence of the
increased pressure of the USA, soon shattered its professed “belief in the rev-
olution”. Osés’s warning concerning the marginalisation of the civilian
Nacionalistas in a military regime turned out to be correct. “The Nacionalistas
cried out against the betrayal” and their leading daily “virulently criticised the
president”, but to no avail (Rouquié 1982: 44). The only tangible result of
their outspoken protests was the closure of El Pampero. And although the
paper reappeared within a few weeks as El Federal –“with the same editor, the
same format, the same office, and the same mailing permit”106– the career of
“the fanatical Nazi, Señor Osés,” was drawing to a well-deserved close. With
the new publication Osés faced his last struggle for a lost cause.107
The Last Struggle
Just as El Pampero, so El Federal still presented the war news “entirely in
favour of the Axis” and was “anti everything Russian, British and Ameri-
can.”108 If only in the paper, which uncritically reproduced the propaganda
coming from Berlin, the Third Reich was not retreating on all fronts but
advancing throughout Europe. In complete disregard of the developments in
the European theatre, in April 1944 Osés’s new paper asserted for instance that
Germany was still going to win the war; its soldiers, the chief propagandist of
German Nazism in Argentina asserted, were more dedicated and had a higher
morale than those of the Allies.109 Even more revealing was that El Federal
did not simply praise the Wehrmacht and defend the imperialist war of the
Fuhrer; the publication unreservedly identified itself with Hitler, the Third
Reich, and its armies, referring to the German troops as “our formations” and
the Allies’ ones as its enemies.110
This outspoken defence of Nazi Germany also overshadowed Osés’s and El
Federal’s enthusiastic support of Juan Domingo Perón. Unlike the majority of
Nacionalistas, who viewed Perón pro-labour policies with some apprehension,
but in accordance with Queraltó’s Alianza (Klein 2001: 118) and Osés’s own
populist and anti-oligarchic positions, El Federal commented every single act
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and public appearance of Perón in positive terms.111 In late November 1944, on
the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the labour secretariat,
which Perón used for the realisation of his social reforms (as well as the basis for
increasing his political power), the paper was full of praise for his achievements.
Moreover, it did not fail to single him out from his colleagues in the regime.
Perón it was, El Federal tirelessly maintained, who deserved the credit for hav-
ing curtailed the power of international capitalism and the old oligarchy.112
While Perón was only at the start of his political career, Osés’s had reached
its end when El Federal published this article in late November 1944. At the
time Osés must have realised that he was a man of the past. The future
belonged to other people, those who were not as compromised as he was, a
collaborator of the Third Reich and an apologist of its war of extermination.
Whatever his paper wrote about Nazi Germany’s strength and the Allies’
weaknesses, fascism was about to loose the confrontation against the joined
forces of its declared enemies –the liberal democracies of the United Stated
and Great Britain on the one hand, and the communist regime of the Soviet
Union on the other. It was no longer the force of the future, as Osés and other
fascists had stated since the early 1930s; its opponents in this epochal con-
frontation were defeating it. His lifework in shatters, one of the leading
Nacionalistas finally retired from public life.
Final Remarks
The reactions of Osés’s numerous opponents to his decision are not known, but
one may safely assume that they received the news with relief and satisfaction,
as one of the most unpleasant activists of the nacionalista movement, who had
tormented his countless victims with relentless diatribes and vitriolic attacks,
finally disappeared from the political scene. During his relatively short journal-
istic and political career Osés had primarily distinguished himself by stirring up
hatred against, as he saw it, the enemies of the Argentine nation: liberals, con-
servatives, leftists, Jews, and even some of his fellow Nacionalistas, namely
those who rejected his collaboration with the Third Reich and/or did not accept
his claims to leadership. Without ignoring his many obvious shortcomings, and
his failure clearly to define the appropriate means for and objectives of the
nacionalista movement, it would be misleading to state that Osés did not give
Nacionalismo its “own political character” and that he had no political vision
36 Marcus Klein
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(Zuleta Alvarez 1975: 291), however. He might not have been very convincing,
and he certainly was not –like all other Nacionalistas– successful, but Osés did
in fact articulate his own vision of a totalitarian regime.
By the late 1930s, after he had distanced himself from his earlier elitist and
anti-popular attitude, the self-declared “First Comrade” of the nacionalista
movement and admirer of the European dictators can be described as a fascist.
Not because of his radical anti-Semitism and vocal support of both Hitler and
Mussolini (Buchrucker 1982: 336), but because his ideas were based on a
“revolutionary form of ultra-nationalism” that was characteristic of all fascist
movements (Griffin 2001: 48). Just as his fascist counterparts in Europe, so
Osés preached “the need for social rebirth” of the nation to reverse its alleged
decline and bring about an era of national greatness. Osés proclaimed that he
aimed at the establishment of a new totalitarian order that would transcend lib-
eral capitalism and communist statism, overcoming the divisions created by
political parties and reuniting all social sectors and classes in a hierarchically
organised national community (Eatwell 1996: 11). He displayed, moreover,
other features that are commonly described as defining characteristics of Euro-
pean fascism, particularly a “vitalist philosophy”, an extreme élitism, the
Führerprinzip, the positive valuation of “violence as end as well as means”
and the trend “to normalize war and/or military virtues” (Payne 1995: 14).
Between the start of his career in Criterio in the late 1920s and early 1930s
and his retreat into obscurity in late 1944, Osés’s worldview changed in many
important ways, hence. While he rejected democracy since his days at the
Catholic magazine, after taking over the nacionalista daily Crisol the erstwhile
defender of the Catholic Church and critic of European fascism emerged as an
outspoken admirer of the European dictators and a proponent of a totalitarian
regime in the Argentine. His growing admiration of the Third Reich culminated
in the open collaboration with Nazi Germany in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
The establishment of El Pampero was, then, the peak as well as the low in his
career. On the one hand, it offered him an unmatched platform for the pursuit of
his own political aspirations. On the other, however, the well-known relations
with the regime of Hitler also undermined his standing. Osés was caught in a
vicious circle. Only the victory of the Axis in the Second World War could pos-
sibly have changed this situation. Fortunately, this never happened.
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